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Abstract
The global financial crisis has cast a strong light on some hitherto obscure corners of the
financial world, provoking an outpouring of calls for concerted international action.
“Hard law” having disappointed, can “soft law”, in the form of international financial
standards, substitute for traditional national legislation . This article examines some of
the difficulties associated with the “international standards as soft law” discourse.
First of all, conceptual problems in the “soft law” discourse itself reveal profoundly
different patterns of legal thought cutting across national boundaries, resulting in
different understandings of international financial standards. Secondly, recent
experience, over the past decade, with some “soft law” international financial standards
as both diagnostic and prophylactic tools, has been decidedly mixed, in fact, largely
unsatisfactory. Thirdly, the “soft law” discourse in international finance appears
strangely remote from the daily grind of international commercial practice, where the
discourse is largely unknown. But perhaps in this disconnect between theory and
practice lies clues to important normative forces at work in international finance, and in
particular the international capital markets. The more one considers the world of
international finance, the more obvious become the outlines of centuries old
transnational merchant law, the contentious lex mercatoria.
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The proposition put forward here is that the formal regulation of financial markets is
supported by a body of strong and persistent customary law, a lex mercatoria, a rarely
acknowledged but powerful undercurrent in finance, especially in its international
iteration. The continued prevalence of oral contracting and the stubborn persistence of
self-regulatory principles are examples.
There are several intriguing implications to this proposition. Is it possible that the
global financial crisis represented not only a failure of formal, state-led regulation, as it
surely did, but also a breakdown of a lex mercatoria of finance? If that is the case,
international standard setters and national regulators, both, ignore this lex mercatoria
(the customs and practices of international finance) at their peril. To do so, would be to
miss a true, powerful, source of normativity operating in international financial market.s
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Introduction
The global financial crisis has cast a strong light on some hitherto obscure corners of the
financial world,1 provoking an outpouring of calls for concerted international action.
Suddenly, or so it seems, there has been a surge of interest in international financial
standards and the various international bodies associated with creating and implementing
them.2 A new discourse looks to gradations of normativity, “soft” through “hard” law,
and points in-between, such as “coercive soft law”.3 “Hard law” having disappointed,
can “soft law”, in the form of international standards, substitute for or augment
traditional national legislation . “Soft law”, a conceptual spillover from the world of
international public law, of treaties and governments, has entered the realm of
international private law.
Eg., the current scandal involving the possible manipulation of LIBOR, the London Interbank
Offered Rate. See Michael Mackenzie, Libor probe shines light on voice brokers, FINANCIAL TIMES
(LONDON), February 16, 2012.
2 See, eg., Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How it Doesn’t), 99
GEORGETOWN L.J.257 (2011); Eilis Ferran & Kern Alexander, Can Soft Law Bodies be Effective? Soft
Systemic Risk Oversight Bodies and the Special Case of the European Systemic Risk Board, 35 EUROPEAN
L. R. 751 (2010).
3 See discussion in Brummer, id, fn 113 citing Andrew Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, Explaining Soft
Law.(work in progress )(2009).
1
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This discourse, however, is problematic at several levels. There are conceptual problems
in the “soft law” discourse itself, that reveal profoundly different patterns of legal thought
cutting across national boundaries. US academics appear to be struggling with
definitional difficulties,4 caught on the seesaw of law necessarily emanating from the
state and judicially enforceability The English common law, a customary law to this
day, is much more comfortable with more diffuse sources of law and less fixated on the
state. And some continental jurists may rarely give judicial enforcement a second
thought.
Secondly, recent experience, over the past decade, with some international financial
standards, as both diagnostic and prophylactic tools, has been decidedly mixed, in fact,
largely unsatisfactory. Looking to international standards, in their current form,
particularly in the area of capital markets, as an effective means of addressing systemic
failings may be unproductive.

Thirdly, the “soft law” discourse in international finance appears strangely remote from
the daily grind of international commercial practice, where the discourse is largely
unknown. International commercial practitioners do not much think about state authority
or judicial enforcement in going about their business. Their analyses are granular; a
reference to “international financial law” would evoke bewilderment, as being devoid of
meaning. The efforts of international practitioners are focused on promoting
effectiveness; concerns as to judicial enforcement are far down the list.

But perhaps in this disconnect between theory and practice lie clues to the normative
forces at work in international financial markets, and how best to harness them.
International finance has a long history, its roots extending back centuries, even
millennia, predating the “hard law” of nation state and its courts.

For some

comparativists, the “hard law” of rules finds its normative force, not in the state and its

4

See Guzman & Meyer, International Soft Law ,2 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 171 (2010)
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courts, but rather in the, for want of a better word, customary law upon which it draws.5
The more one considers the world of international finance, where commercial practice
has operated for centuries in the absence of, or despite, national law, the more obvious
become the outlines of financial customary law.
The proposition put forward here is that the formal regulation of financial markets is
supported by a body of customary law, a lex mercatoria, a rarely acknowledged but
powerful undercurrent in finance, especially in its international iteration. This lex
mercatoria demonstrates persistence and continuity, stretching back centuries, and it is
neither “hard” nor “soft” as is understood in the current discourse.

There are several intriguing implications to this proposition. Is it possible that the global
financial crisis represented not only a failure of formal, state-led regulation, as it surely
did, but also a breakdown of a lex mercatoria of finance? If that is the case, international
standard setters and national regulators, both, ignore this lex mercatoria (the customs
and practices of international finance) at their peril. To do so, would be to miss a true,
powerful, source of normativity operating in international financial markets
Further, are international financial standard setters, in their efforts, attempting to recreate
a lex mercatoria of finance? Do we need international financial standards at all, or just
better lex mercatoria? Will the current waves of regulation push the lex mercatoria
into hiding? Or, on the contrary, will regulatory turbulence and impasses promote the
blossoming of new forms of international practices?

The first part of this paper looks to the differing patterns of legal thought which cut
across national boundaries and the implications for the “soft law” discourse in the context
of international financial standards. The second part of the paper examines the recent
misadventures involving “soft law” international financial standards in the capital
markets. The third part of the part looks at some of the characteristics of international
See, eg., the interesting discussion in Walter Weyrauch & Marueen Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking:
The Case of the “Gypsies”, 103 YALE L.J. 323 (1993-1994) on “State Law vs Private Lawmaking “ at pp
326 ff.

5

Page 5 of 31

commercial practice that demonstrative the multiplicity of normativity at work. The last
part of the paper looks at international capital markets from the perspective of a lex
mercatoria and the implications flowing from this.

I. Differing Patterns of Legal Thought and the “Soft Law” Discourse
Academics in the United States appear to be struggling with definitional difficulties,6
caught on the seesaw that law must emanate from the state and be judicially enforceable.
The English common law, on the other hand, is comfortable with more diffuse sources
of law, with less fixation on the state. And some continental jurists may instinctively
regard judicial enforcement as less than significant in the larger scheme of things.
Formal written law, and its judicial enforcement, are imprinted on the US legal psyche.
Beyond these boundaries lies lawlessness. The dominance of written law and judicial
enforcement is indicative of the two great historical sources of US law: the English
common law as wrought by an 18thC judiciary and European civilian thinking of the
immediate post revolutionary period.
Great deference is paid to the judiciary in the United States and procedure dominates
substance. One of the finest commercial courts in the world is the Delaware Court of
Chancery, which, having deliberately adopted the jurisdiction of its English counterpart
in post-revolutionary days of 1792, continues, almost alone in the world, to exercise a
very pure form of equitable jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the United States is also, in the European tradition, a land of written
law, formal statutory law and regulation, in a way which the UK decidedly is not. In the
United States, there is no aversion to written law; there is lots of it. In the view of H.
Patrick Glenn, this constitutes the “particular genius” 7 of the US legal system, “its
constructive combination of elements of both civil and common law.”8 Because
language and history bind America and England, the legacy of the English judiciary has

See Guzman & Meyer, “International Soft Law” , supra note 3.
H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 248, 251 (2d ed. 2004).
8 Id.
6

7

Page 6 of 31

remained at the surface, readily observable, resulting in the characterization of the
United States as a “common law” jurisdiction.
But is it really? The US legal system is certainly unlike others found in the
Commonwealth.9 According to Glenn, in “many respects US law represents a deliberate
rejection of common law principles, with preference being given to more affirmative
ideas clearly derived from civil law. These were not somehow reinvented in the United
States but taken over directly from civilian sources in a massive process of change in
adherence to legal information in the nineteenth century.” 10
Like that of France, the US legal system is the product of revolution, symbolizing a break
with what came before. In the case of the United States, the legal system and the state
are conjoined twins, born together and inextricably linked by the Constitution.11
The US seesaw, balancing formal legislation against judicial enforcement, is apparent in
much of the modern US-influenced discourse on law and development, for example. In
large measure due to the geo-political forces at work, the period subsequent to the breakup of the former Soviet Union saw a massive transplantation of US-style legislation in
Central Europe and East Asia.12 When this “good law”, this legislation, proved
ineffective (or did not behave quite as expected), there were immediate calls for better
judicial enforcement (and training of the judiciary to do it).
In the United Kingdom, statutory law, written law, has traditionally been a second best
solution, a last, uncomfortable, resort, representing a failure of the common law. The
prospect of codification is even more chilling in the UK, giving rise to atavistic visions of
guillotines and burning barricades. Arguably, all this has changed, at least
superficially, with the entry of the UK into the European Union and the massive
realignment of English statutory law to the dictates of Brussels.

9 Except, perhaps, for Canada which has been subject to the beneficent influences of the Napoleonic
Code through Quebec, and later direct statutory and judicial influences from the United States itself.
10 Glenn, supra note 6, 248.
11 One might say that, ultimately, all law in the United States is constitutional law.
12 A similar wave of US style legislation crashed upon former combatant countries in the Asia-Pacific
after World War II.
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These different patterns of legal thought are at the heart of the trans-Atlantic debate
of the last decade as to the superiority of one or the other of two different
approaches to financial regulation, rules-based or principles-based. It also explains
the popularity in the UK of “voluntary” codes of commercial behaviour (and the
difficulty of transplanting them elsewhere) and “comply or disclose” as a regulatory
technique. 13 Principles-based regulation and voluntary codes of conduct, however,
do not operate in a vacuum in the UK; they derive their normative and operational
force from common, but non-statutory, understandings of commercial behaviour.
In many of the codal countries of continental Europe, the judiciary, of course, plays
a different, much subsidiary, role than in the UK or the United States. The
triumvirate of the written word, doctrine, code and statute, are more authoritative.
In different ways, both the UK and the rest of Europe are thus open to concepts of
international standards, transnational norms, in a way in which the United States
may not be. From the UK perspective, such norms may represent an extension,
internationally, of principles based, voluntary codes provided they are rooted in
and informed by commercial realities. From the European perspective, the fact that
such norms are written gives them inherent authority, irrespective of their
provenance, state or otherwise.14
But in the United States, “law” revolves around the twin stars of formal legislation and
judiciary, only occasionally breaking free of their gravitational pull.

Given such a

strongly ingrained pattern of legal thought, international standards or “soft law” concepts
of normativity floating free of state and judiciary, are problematic. 15
II. International Financial Standards

See Cally Jordan, Cadbury Twenty Years on, UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER,
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2099820.
14 See generally, NILS JANSEN, THE MAKING OF LEGAL AUTHORITY, NON-LEGISLATIVE CODIFICATION IN
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2010).
15 And, yet, interestingly enough, the concept of self-regulation in the modern financial world finds its
strongest national expression in the United States. Like the jury trial, self regulation of the financial
industry (the exchanges and intermediaries) is a legacy of 18thC England.
13
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During the global financial crisis, the realisation came, too late, that international capital
markets were the purveyors of systemic risk and financial chaos; however, they remain
much understudied and misunderstood. “Soft law” solutions, at least those taking the
form of international financial standards, were no panacea for what ailed the global
financial system.

However, international financial standards had surged to prominence in the wake of the
Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 with the creation of the Financial Stability Forum
(FSF).16 The role of the FSF was to promote financial stability across national borders
and provide an early warning system, identifying potential weaknesses or
“vulnerabilities” in national financial systems, with a view to preventing a repetition of
the localized financial chaos of 1997. The development of international standards for
financial and other commercial regulation and the implementation by the IMF and The
World Bank of the Financial Sector Assessment Program or “FSAP” (designed to
monitor and assess financial stability on a country by country basis) were two of the
initiatives associated with the FSF.
That the FSF was a failure is patently obvious. It has been relegated to the dustbin of
history with little ado. The global financial crisis revealed its inadequacies and those of
its instrumentalities: international standard setting and financial sector assessment
initiatives. Was the approach of the FSF, and its uncritical reliance on a hodgepodge of
international standards, in the assessment of the stability of financial systems,
fundamentally flawed?
A. The Role of the FSF and the FSAP

16

For a more detailed critique of the Financial Stability Forum and the use of international
financial standards by the IMF and The World Bank in the Financial Sector Assessment
initiative, see Cally Jordan, The Dangerous Illusion of International Financial Standards and
the Legacy of the Financial Stability Forum, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 333 (2011)
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The FSF was caught unawares by the global financial crisis,17 although it was purportedly
purpose built to detect “vulnerabilities” in financial systems and serve as an early
warning system. Masses of information had been collected by bodies such as the IMF
and The World Bank pursuant to the FSF- mandated FSAP initiative, but to no avail.
It is hard to escape the conclusion that the FSAPs, conducted on a country by country
basis using various international standards, were asking the wrong questions or failing to
interpret properly the information collected.

The widespread adoption of these international financial standards with their top down
approach and riddled with assumption, and their use as indicators of potential financial
instability, should have been put into serious question by this financial crisis. The
promotion of simplistic, high level, “solutions” to complex and deep-rooted structural
problems in various parts of the global financial system is a search for a “quick fix”, and
doomed to failure.18

The financial crisis though raised serious doubts as to the utility of these exercises and
painfully highlighted the ineffectiveness of the FSF. As Arner and Taylor point out, the
crisis put into question the international “soft law” approach and the workings of “policy
networks.”19
Implementation of the FSF agenda focused primarily on the use of the FSAP, the
financial sector assessments conducted by the IMF in developed economies, and jointly
by the IMF and The World Bank, in developing economies. The mandate was to identify
“vulnerabilities” in financial systems, on a country by country basis, with a view to

With the benefit of hindsight, of course, there were the prescient few who saw it coming. “The
banking world ignored Gillian Tett when she predicted the credit crisis two years ago”, Laura Barton,
On the Money, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 31, 2008; available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/31/creditcrunch-gillian-tett-financial-times (last
viewed August 11, 2010).
18 “Admittedly, the G20 has entrusted the Financial Stability Board with the mission of monitoring
the standard-setting activity and has mandated the Basel Committee, IOSCO and the IAIS (among
others) with the task of developing new rules. However, this choice seems more a quick-fix than a
sustainable strategy. It will neither preserve state unity on the international stage, nor solve the
issues of circumvention of national and regional democratic processes.” Id. at 108.
19 Id. at 4.
17
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nipping financial crises in the bud. In particular, priority was to be given to
systematically important countries. The FSF identified 12 international standards to be
used in the process of “benchmarking” or “rating” a financial system. 20

20

“The 12 standard areas highlighted here have been designated by the FSF as key for sound financial
systems and deserving of priority implementation depending on country circumstances. While the key
standards vary in terms of their degree of international endorsement, they are broadly accepted as
representing minimum requirements for good practice. Some of the key standards are relevant for more
than one policy area, e.g. sections of the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and
Financial Policies have relevance for aspects of payment and settlement as well as financial regulation and
supervision.
Area

Standard

Issuing Body

Macroeconomic Policy and Data Transparency
Monetary and
financial policy
transparency

Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and
Financial Policies

IMF

Fiscal policy
transparency

Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency

IMF

Data dissemination

Special Data Dissemination Standard /
General Data Dissemination System 1

IMF

Institutional and Market Infrastructure
Insolvency

Insolvency and Creditor Rights 2

World Bank

Corporate
governance

Principles of Governance

OECD

Accounting

International Accounting Standards (IAS) 3

IASB 4

Auditing

International Standards on Auditing (ISA)

IFAC 4

Payment and
settlement

Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems
Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems

CPSS
CPSS/IOSCO

Market integrity

The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force / FATF
9 Special Recommendations Against Terrorist Financing
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The FSAPs produced a veritable gold mine of data over time. 21 Unfortunately, some of
the data is of dubious reliability and quality. There are several reasons for this. The
international standards themselves are not of the same caliber. Among the 12
international standards chosen by the FSF there is overlap, duplication and
inconsistency. The methodology of the FSAP process was in a constant state of flux.
The teams conducting the FSAPs varied in expertise and sophistication. Querelles de
chapelle22 between the IMF and The World Bank were not unheard of.
Nevertheless, the data accumulated was impressive; the difficulty has been that it cannot
be used in a narrow, scientific way, given its deficiencies. Rather, it needs a kind of
qualitative interpretation which has not always been possible. Some of the observations,
with hindsight, appear spot on. Iceland was identified as vulnerable as far back as 2002.
The importance of supervision and risk assessment of large, complex financial
institutions was also recognized early on. Difficulties with some of the standards, such as

Financial Regulation and Supervision
Banking supervision Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision

BCBS

Securities regulation Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation

IOSCO

Insurance
supervision

Insurance Core Principles

IAIS

Financial Stability Board, Compendium on Standards; available at:
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/key_standards.htm (last viewed August 16, 2010).
This huge volume of data does not seem to find its way readily into the academic literature,
although several people at the IMF, in particular, Jennifer Elliott, have laudably been publishing
papers making use of the data. See, e.g., Ana Carvajal & Jennifer. Elliott, The Change of Enforcement in
Securities Markets: Mission Impossible” (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 09/168, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1457591.
22 The expression refers to pointless internal disputes and rivalries within an organization.
21
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the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, were noted.23 However,
given the volume of data and its variable quality, important observations may have been
lost in the “noise”

B. Inadequacies of the FSAP Experience
Most importantly though, the FSAPs were sometimes asking the wrong questions. Some
international standards failed to differentiate among financial markets in different parts of
the world, or to recognize the stratification of any one particular market. Financial
markets, even internal domestic ones, are not monolithic. Most ironically, for standards
billing themselves as “international”, many of the standards employed completely
missed the international and cross-border aspects of financial markets. This was due to
the fact that many of the so-called “international” standards were simply reheated
domestic regulation, which did not look to international dimensions of an issue.

The proliferation of codes and standards used in the FSAP process also proved
problematic. The standards vary greatly in their origins, level of sophistication degree to
which they represent a truly international consensus. They continue to jostle uneasily
against each other, demonstrating overlap and generating inconsistencies. Some
international standards, such as International Financial Reporting Standards, had been
decades in the making by large, international teams of financial experts. Others, such as
the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 1999, had been cobbled together; they
were brand new and untested, as well as not representing any meaningful international
consensus. However, by grouping together these 12 sets of international standards under
the umbrella of the FSAP process, the FSF gave equal, and perhaps unwarranted,
legitimacy to all.

Inadequate integration of the results also diminished their relevance. As the “ratings” of
countries on various standards began to circulate publicly, it became possible for
The IOSCO Objectives and Principles were not designed to identify systemic risk; rather, until the
recent amendments in June 2010, they focused on traditional, one might even say outdated, investor
protection mechanisms and market regulation institutions.
23
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countries to “game” the system, by enacting legislation or adopting measures that would
“tick the boxes” without necessarily being of any effect.24

As well, the voluntary nature of the FSAP process was problematic. As of the date of
the 2006 IMF evaluation, “some 20 to 25% of countries that are ‘systemically important’
and/or have vulnerable financial systems – two key criteria endorsed by the IMF and The
World Bank Boards – have not been assessed.”25 Again as of 2006, four systemically
important countries in particular stood out: Turkey, Indonesia, China, and most
importantly of all, the United States.26
In reacting to criticism that it did not see the global financial crisis coming, the IMF
identified the failure of the US to volunteer for an FSAP as a major factor.27 The US, for
its part, had justified its objections to participating in the FSAP, by invoking the heavy
burden such an assessment would place “on the scarce resources of the [IMF]”.28

The essentially domestic focus of the FSAP process has also been singled out for
criticism. Although “contagion” had been at the heart of the Asian financial crisis which
led to the creation of the FSF and the FSAPs, the FSAP process ignored cross-border
implications. As the 2006 IMF evaluation diplomatically put it: ““Greater efforts by the
CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR , LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT
LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD [PAGE AND CITE] (2008). See also Cally
24

Jordan, The Conundrum of Corporate Governance, 30 Brook. J. Int’l L. 983 (2005) on Germany’s
introduction of a voluntary code of corporate governance.
25 INT’L MONETARY FUND INDEP. EVALUATION OFF., Report ON THE EVALUATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (2006),at 7, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2006/fsap/eng/pdf/report.pdf. A subsequent review, THE
FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM AFTER TEN YEARS - EXPERIENCES AND REFORMS FOR THE NEXT DECADE,
August 28, 2009, appeared in September 2009; available at:
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/082809B.
26 Turkey subsequently volunteered and the US finally permitted an FSAP to be conducted, in the
wake of the global financial crisis.
27 “The Fund has also deflected criticism of its failure to predict the crisis. Because the United States
refuses to be subject to an IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), Managing Director StraussKahn argues, the Fund cannot be responsible for a lack of supervision. The FSAP is one of the IMF’s main
supervisory instruments, and it was not employed in the United States during the lead-up to the crisis”.
Laurie Glapa, The IMF faces post-crisis criticism, Center for International Finance and Development at
the University of Iowa College of Law, Oct. 15, 2009; available at
http://uicifd.blogspot.com/search/label/IMF (last viewed August 11, 2010).
28 Bossone, supra note 30.
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IMF to distil common cross-country messages from the various FSAP exercises would be
welcome”.29
The difficulties associated with execution of the FSAP program were exacerbated by the
assumptions operating below the surface of some of the international standards.30 Some
“international” standards are not international at all, but rather reheated domestic, often
US domestic, law. The weakness, in this case, is that such standards are riddled with the
hidden assumptions and deficiencies of their country of primary origin. And where that
country of origin is the United States, implementing such standards (as is the ultimate
goal of the FSAP exercise) may mean adopting inappropriate and suboptimal regulatory
approaches.
Take, for example, the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (the
IOSCO Principles), one of the 12 international standards mandated by the FSF, and
referred to on several occasions above. Originally formulated in 1998, in the shadow of
the Asian financial crisis, the IOSCO Principles were backward looking, taking as their
point of departure the institutions, regulatory framework and market structures of the
United States, as they existed in the mid-1990s, even then based on antiquated 1930s
regulation.
The IOSCO Principles, because they looked to the US markets and regulation of an
earlier and rapidly vanishing era, subsumed the hidden assumptions of that time and
place, assumptions which lie deeply buried in their originating conditions, and are rarely
explicitly acknowledged. First, there is the 1930s emphasis on retail investors and equity
trading. Derivatives, of course, were not on the radar screen (for one thing, they do not
come under the regulatory purview of the US SEC), and debt markets virtually ignored
(derivatives are usually structured as debt instruments). The “unregulated” or private
placement market (wherein hedge funds lurk) were also ignored, having received
perfunctory treatment in the 1930s. Securities were still pieces of paper in the 1930s, and

INT’L MONETARY FUND INDEP. EVALUATION OFF, supra note 21 at 11.
Putting aside for the moment International Financial Reporting Standards and the BIS Capital
Adequacy standards which have a long history behind them.
29

30

Page 15 of 31

the US regulation continued to play catch up in terms of recognizing the implications of
the electronic age. Faith in self-regulatory market institutions remained a deeply
entrenched notion and the efficient market hypothesis (a theory now somewhat battered
by the crisis) formally acknowledged in US securities legislation.31 Finally, U.S.
regulation was, and is, notoriously domestically focused.
These features of U.S. securities regulation shine through the IOSCO Principles. They
were also the areas of weaknesses, in terms of where the global financial crisis exerted its
greatest pressures.
Even the revisions to the IOSCO Principles announced June 10, 2010, while adding
eight new principles “based on the lessons learned from the recent financial crisis and
subsequent changes in the regulatory environment”,32 do not revisit the original 30
principles and their underlying assumptions. Importantly, the eight new principles do
recognize that the “financial markets which IOSCO members regulate, or may be exempt
from regulation, can be the mechanism by which risk is transferred within the financial
system” (emphasis added).33 Unregulated markets finally appear on the radar screen,
and the markets themselves (not just institutions) are recognized as systemically
important.34
Nevertheless, the original thirty IOSCO Principles remain untouched, an example of path
dependency in action perhaps. IOSCO has been working around them, addressing
significant issues outside the original IOSCO Principles, in new initiatives and reports, as
well as by the addition of the eight new principles. However, the assumptions underlying
See, eg., §2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933: “CONSIDERATION OF PROMOTION OF EFFICIENCY,
COMPETITION AND CAPITAL FORMATION. Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in
rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate
in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors,
whether the action will promote efficiency, competition , and capital formation”.
32 Infra note 29.
33 Press release, Global Securities Regulators adopt new principles and increase focus on systemic risk,
IOSCO/MR/10/2010, Montreal, June 10, 2010; available at:
http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS188.pdf (last viewed August 20, 2010)
34 Criticism of the IOSCO Principles is not, in any way, to suggest that IOSCO itself has been a flawed
initiative. Quite to the contrary. IOSCO has been a resounding success. Its significance to
international capital markets has been growing by leaps and bounds and its members increasingly
convinced of the importance of its mission. IOSCO saw the crisis coming and continues to produce
topical and informed reports on a wide variety of timely issues,
31
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the eight new principles are different (“regulation” has dethroned both the “efficient
market” and “self-regulation”), thus creating certain internal tensions within the enlarged
set of principles
But the IOSCO Principles, old and new, remain at the heart of the FSAP exercise. Which
brings us back to contagion and predictability. The FSF and the FSAPs did not address
contagion issues. Neither did they predict the global financial crisis. They were asking
the wrong questions, looking in the wrong directions and, blinded by the glare of
international standards, failed to appreciate the complexity and diversity of financial
markets and the problems posed by their regulation. 35
III. International Commercial Practice and Soft Law
The experiences of the last fifteen years have demonstrated the difficulties associated
with the use of international financial standards. It is hard to escape the conclusion that
the debate itself as to the “soft law” nature of international financial standards may be
simply beside the point. Certainly, different legal traditions demonstrate different levels
of openness and receptivity to international norms which do not derive from state
authority and are not subject to national judicial enforcement. The problems associated
with international financial standards may stem, not from their “soft law” nature, but
rather from their substance and sources: assumption riddled, reheated national law from
which are forged into top-down, one-size-fits-all “international” standards.
This is not how the world of international commercial law and finance operates and may
explain why the “soft law’ discourse in international finance appears so strangely remote

35

The financial industry too seems prepared to welcome an approach which is less reliant on
top-down, assumption-riddled, one-size-fits-all international standards. “When everyone is
suffering from what appears to be the same shock, the desire to implement a co-ordinated
response is high, and because of that desire, the ability is stronger. When everyone is starting
to recover, the desire to co-ordinate is inevitably lessened, and as a result it will be more
difficult. Luckily, this is probably a good thing….G20 members and their leaders have been
very wise in the past 12 months. The G20 creation itself is a fantastic development. But let’s
not require it always to have its members do the same thing at the same time.” Jim O’Neill,
Financial Times, Sept. 18, 2009 at 9.
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from the daily grind of international commercial practice, where the discourse is largely
unknown.
International commercial practitioners engage in a constant balancing of risks, in an
admittedly uncertain world.

Instinctively cognizant of the dynamism and layered

complexity36 of legal systems, international practitioners engage in multi-perspective
analyses and redundancy in expression and execution.

They do not much think about state authority or judicial enforcement in going about their
business. Their analyses are granular; a reference to “international financial law” would
evoke bewilderment, as being devoid of meaning. The efforts of international
practitioners are focused on promoting effectiveness; concerns as to judicial enforcement
are far down the list.
International project finance demonstrates many of these characteristics. Large projects
will entail the creation of a virtually autonomous legal framework in which the project
operates, especially in emerging economies where there may be little formal written law
to begin with, and faint hope of judicial enforcement. A vast construct of contract,
thousands of pages of detailed provisions, will link project managers, suppliers, subcontractors, private financiers, sovereign governments, multilateral development banks
and financial institutions such as the World Bank and MIGA. Internal panels of experts
may be constituted in advance to resolve issues which inevitably arise, precluding even
resort to external international commercial arbitration. Multiple choices of law may be
applicable to various aspects of the transaction.
Take the case of the huge Nam Theun hydroelectric project in Laos (supported in part by
The World Bank and MIGA), for example.37 Laos is a small, poor, landlocked country
with a population of six and a half million people and a GDP per capita in 2010 of less
than US$2500. Nam Theun 2, or NT 2 as it is known, required US$330 million in equity
See discussion in SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS (6th ed. 1998). at 28889.
37 The project began commercial operations in March 2010.
36
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and US$920 million in debt financing. At the time of signing in 2005, it was the largest
private sector cross-border power project and the largest private sector hydroelectric
power project financing in the world.
The primary choice of law for the thousands of pages of project finance contracts was
Laotian law.38 Laos is noted neither for the sophistication of its legislative framework
nor the high level skills of its judiciary. But on the other hand, there was clearly little
expectation among the dozens and dozens of signatories that there would ever be
recourse to either Laotian law or its courts.
Where there was no Laotian law available for application, English law was a fallback. It
was quite uncertain though as to where Laotian law left off and English law would pick
up.

But again, there was little expectation that recourse to

any formal law or

international commercial arbitration, for that matter, would eventuate.
However, as a precautionary measure, the entire stack of contractual documentation was
carted off to the national assembly of Laos and enacted into “law”, a somewhat symbolic
gesture more than anything and readily accomplished in a one party state. The point to
note here is the redundancy and recourse to multiple forms of normativity, characteristic
of international finance. Little store is set by formal legislation or enforcement by the
courts. Like those tiny ships setting sail from European ports in the sixteenth century in
quest of faraway fortunes, the entire endeavour is fraught with uncertainty and is an
exercise in calculated risk taking. The objective of all concerned is a practical one; to
make it work.
There appears to be a huge chasm between the gritty world of international finance in
action and the lofty realm of international financial standard setting. But perhaps in this
disconnect between theory and practice lie clues to the normative forces at work in
international financial markets. The more one considers the world of international
finance, the more obvious become the outlines of centuries old customs and practices,
an international merchant law, the ghostly outlines of the lex mercatoria
The Government of Laos was a party to many of the contracts and acted in various capacities.
Where sovereigns are involved, the use of their domestic law, at least notionally, is often required.
38
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IV. International Capital Markets and the Lex Mercatoria
A. What is lex mercatoria
Interest in lex mercatoria as a subject of intellectual inquiry waxes and wanes; it is a
notoriously slippery concept, with numerous, divergent meanings. Some dispute its
existence39 but the “romance” of the law merchant,40 a phrase coined by Wyndham
Bewes in 1923, continues to casts a powerful spell according to Hatzimihail. 41 There are
several generally cited operative concepts traditionally attributed to the lex mercatoria:
harmony and equitability, mutual confidence and good faith, the binding force of
ordinary undertakings (oral contracts) of merchants, self-regulation deriving from its
own needs and experiences, expediency and expeditiousness. 42 Goode points to the
certainty and consistency of practice, reasonableness, notoriety and co-normativity with
mandatory law.43 And, lex mercatoria, having preceded the nation state, was inherently
international, or perhaps a better word would be, anational.
Ralf Michaels has recently provided a useful summation of the some of the various
senses in which the term has been used.44 He looks at lex mercatoria in its linear,
chronological manifestations. The “ancent lex mercatoria” of the Middle Ages was a
“transnational set of norms and procedural principles established by and for commerce in
(relative) autonomy from states”.45
As the rise of nation states, and written codes and legislation, crowded out (or subsumed)
this lex mercatoria, it supposedly dissipated. Then there was the “renaissance of the idea
as a ‘new lex mercatoria’ in the 20th century, an informal and flexible net of rules and
arbitrators establishing a private international commercial law.”46 Most recently,
Emily Kadens,The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEXAS LAW REV. 1153 (2012)
Wyndham Bewes, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW MERCHANT (Sweet &Maxwell, London, 1923).
41 Nikitas Hatzimihail, The Many Lives- And Faces- of Lex Mercatoria: History as Genealogy in
International Business Law, 71 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 169 (2008).
42 Disputes settled “between the ebb and flow of the tide”, or “from tide to tide”. See, among others,
Charles Kerr, The Origins and Development of the Lex Mercatoria, 15 VA.LAW REVIEW 350 (1928-29)
43 Roy Goode [cite]
44 Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 INDIANA J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL
STUDIES 447 (2007)
45 Id., 448.
46 Id.
39
40
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according to Michaels, there has emerged a “’new new lex mercatoria’, which moves
from an amorphous and flexible soft law to an established system of law with codified
legal rules (first and foremost the UNIDROIT Principles of International and Commercial
Law) and strongly institutionalized court-like international arbitration.”47
The search for one comprehensive body or theory of modern lex mercatoria has
bedeviled much theoretical scholarship in the area, but what if the answer is much
simpler. There are numerous distinct varieties of lex mercatoria, sharing certain
persistent communalities with specialized characteristics evolving over the centuries, a
Darwinian lex mercatoria, if you like. Berger has written of the separate sets of
transnational commercial law for specialized areas of international business, such as the
lex petrolia or lex sportiva.48 Could it be that international capital markets are supported
by a large body or bodies of lex mercatoria that has persisted over centuries?

Does a

largely unrecognized and unacknowledged, but powerful, lex financeria, rooted in the
distant past, undergird modern capital markets?
B. The Persistence of the lex mercatoria
Interestingly, it is the “ancient” lex mercatoria, in the sense of “ a transnational set of
norms and procedural principles established by and for commerce in (relative) autonomy
from states”, that shines through the workings of modern international capital markets.
The notion of “self-regulation” for example, which is enshrined in the IOSCO Principles,
can be traced straight back to medieval guilds and the City of London.
1. The City of London and Self Regulation
It is not an accident that self-regulation of financial institutions and intermediaries has
found its strongest expression, at least until recently, in the United Kingdom.49

Even

well into the 19thC, the financial center of the United Kingdom and, arguably the
world’s most important international financial center, was the City of London, usually
Id.
Klaus Peter Berger, The New Law Merchant and the Global Market Place – A 21st Century View of
Transnational Commercial Law, available at: www.trans-lex.org/000002.
49 The United States inherited it from the UK in pre-revolutionary times, and it persisted through the
centuries as it served the interests of iinance well.
47

44
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simply referred to as “the City”.50 The City of London predates the Magna Carta (1215
CE). “[T]he national importance that was attached to the ancient liberties and franchises
of London, may be estimated by the fact that it was made an express provision of the
Magna Charta itself, that the City of London should have all its ancient liberties and
customs…”.51
The City of London, home to merchants and traders, has been special for centuries, if not
millennia. “The time-honoured City of London, like many other cities which flourished
under the auspices of Imperial Rome, seems to have actually constituted, during the
lengthened and obscure period of the Middle Ages, a species of independent selfgovernment, contrasting by the comparative enlightenment of its municipal institutions,
with that dark feudal system, whose iron chains bound down the Nations of Europe to the
exclusive service of warfare or the priesthood.”52 In the City, commerce reigned.
Not only were the franchises and customs of the City recognized as carrying immunity
from the burdens of the feudal system (and the common law generally), but the
immunities later extended even to acts of Parliament. “Now it must be borne in mind,
that when a general statute, silent as to the City of London, passes both Houses of
Parliament, for effecting a reform in any branch of the law as to which there happens to
exist a peculiar custom of the City of London, it is at least doubtful whether the statute
will prevail within the limits of the City. It is laid down in some text-books, that the City
customs are of such force that they shall prevail against a general Act of Parliament
either using negative or positive words. Lord Coke, in numerous passages, lays it down,
‘that the special customs of the City shall prevail against the general law of the land’”.53
Customs which can face down acts of Parliament are powerful indeed, so it should not be
surprising that vestigial, and perhaps not so vestigial, elements persist in the City of

The City of London is a geographically defined area and a corporation dating back to the 12thC.
“The Guildhall body, though nominally the Corporation of London, are restricted both for good and
evil within the small space of 600 acres, and to a population of about one-tenth of the whole
Metropolis of London”. The City of London Corporation Inquiry, 19 L.REV.& Q.J.BRIT&FOREIGN
JURISPRUDENCE 389, 424, 1853-February1854.
51 Id., 392.
52 Id., 391-92.
53 Id., 401-02.
50
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London. Much of the autonomy commented upon in the report from which the above
excerpts are taken may have dissipated in the years since 1853.54 However, even up to
the financial reforms of the late 20thC and the creation of the now doomed Financial
Services Authority (2000), autonomy and self-regulation defined the financial services
industry in the City of London.
2. The Case of Oral Contracts
The use and recognition of oral contracts is another characteristic of a lex mercatoria.
The nudum pactum, ie the contract without formalities, did not exist in Roman law but
was, in the interests of commercial expediency (and the generalized illiteracy of the age),
recognized among merchants and traders.55 Napoleon’s 1807 Code de commerce
brought together much of the pre-existing commercial customs and practices, which
would include various aspects of lex mercatoria, including the recognition of oral
contracts among merchants. To this day, France makes a distinction between “civil”
contracts (among non-merchants, and governed by the Code civil), and commercial
contracts (among merchants and governed by the Code de commerce).
Commercial contracts may be proven more simply than ordinary, or “civil”, contracts.
Ordinary (civil) contracts for over Euro1500 must be made in writing56, which now
includes electronic forms of writing.57 Commercial contracts are exempt from this
requirement with article L110-3 of the Code de commerce providing that commercial
agreements may be proven by any means unless otherwise provided by law.58 By way of
contrast, the later German civil code (Bürgerliches Gestzbuch or BGB) posits a
universal principle of consensual contract and the commercial code does not need to

The City of London Corporation Inquiry, id., recounted perceived abuses associated with the
autonomy of the City. “The present members of the Corporation of London…seem to have imbibed
the notion that in order to divert a reform of the present system, and the substitution of one which
should really serve the purposes of a Metropolitan municipality, it would suffice to urge that there is
no ground for the imputation of ’moral turpitude or personal corruption’.” This was in
contradistinction to their predecessors in the eighteenth century where “[h]eavy tavern expenses
were allowed, the cause of charity and education was neglected, and publicity avoided”. Id., 426-27.
55 [cite]
56 Art. 1341 Civil Code (Fr).
57 Art. 1316 Civil Code (Fr).
58 The law does otherwise provide in some instances, such as for contracts for the sale of businesses.
54

Page 23 of 31

make an exceptions for merchants or traders.59 Oral contracts among merchants are thus
enforceable, as are any other contracts.
Oral contracts among merchants were also recognized in the City of London. Given the
existence of a recognized commercial practice, the 1677 Statute of Frauds60 (requiring a
writing for the enforceability of certain contracts) did not apply in the City of London.
This was explicitly acknowledged in the case law even as to the transfer of land. “Ever
since the Statute of Frauds, the conveyance of estates and interests in land, except by an
instrument in writing has been deemed to be prohibited by law. But here, again, the
custom of London conflicts; and the old Guildhall law provides that a bargain and sale
for valuable consideration of houses or lands in London by word only is sufficient to pass
the same [See on this point, 2 Jurist, 675; Busher v. Thompson, 16 Law J.C.P.59]
(emphasis in the original).” 61
So it is no coincidence that the motto of the London Stock Exchange (established in
1801) is the famous “Dictum meum pactum” – “My word is my bond”, or more literally,
“My word is my agreement”.
3. Modern Finance and the Lex Mercatoria
But is this of any relevance to the world of modern finance? 62 The rivalry between
Parliament and the City of London persists to this day, underpinning the self-regulatory
approach that is so characteristic of Anglo-American finance. Symptomatic of the
continued rivalry is the UK’s reputation for “light touch” financial regulation. The UK
touted light touch regulation in the decade leading up to the 2008 global financial crisis
as the great advantage of London as an international financial center.63

See arts. 125, 126 BGB.
Now largely repealed in the UK [cite to 1954 statute].
61 [cite]
62 “Investment bankers”, as understood in the United States, are “merchant bankers” in London, an
indication of the persistence of the institutions and patterns of thought associated with merchant law
(the literal translation of lex mercatoria). Historically, merchant bankers trace their origins to Jewish
bankers specializing in international finance in Italy (bills of exchange, underwriting, financings,
futures, grain guarantees, credit and insurance). They sat among the merchants and used the
techniques of the silk route for providing long distance financing.[source]
63 Not surprisingly, less is now heard about light touch regulation.
59
60
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Oral contracts are also still a hallmark of modern finance. Berger maintains that “the
morality and mutual trust” represented by ‘my word is my bond’ even today is a more
generalized characteristic of “international business which turns the contractual promise
into a categorical imperative”.64
The London Stock Exchange, whose motto it is, still claims title as the world’s premier
international capital market.65 The City of London has also been home to the swaps and
derivatives markets, so maligned in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The
swaps and derivatives markets developed in the 1980s as a “telephone market”.66 Oral,
bilateral contracts were entered into over the telephone by specialized traders, relatively
few in number. Despite the international reach of these transactions, the traders and much
of the trading were geographically concentrated in the City of London.67 These contracts
were long term (often exceeding ten years in duration) and for very large amounts of
money, the usual factors militating in favor of written agreements. Despite this, these
oral contracts often remained undocumented for months, if not years. Over time,
standardized contracts68 were developed to support the oral contracts and facilitate
subsequent documentation. Radical changes in modern technology did not
fundamentally change the nature of the swaps and derivative markets; at least some
corners of them remain a telephone market.
Modern finance is full of “closed cells”, pockets of professionals repeatedly dealing with
each other69 in relative, or perhaps total, obscurity. Even the language of modern finance
is metaphorically cloaked in darkness, full of “dark pools” and “black boxes”. 70
Although conversations among traders are now recorded as a matter of course, the
ephemeral nature and intimacy of the human voice plays tricks with the speakers,
Supra note [ ], 12.
Although subject now to competition from a variety of contenders and various forces in the
marketplace.
66 The advanced technology of the day.
67 Although not exclusively.
68 The ISDA Master Agreements.
69 “Many in the industry describe the interdealer market as acosy club of select banks and brokers,
who play by their own rules, fashioned since the early 1970s when the collapse of fixed currencies
ushered an era of volatile exchange rates that required a middle man to help banks trade.” Michael
Mackenzie, Libor probe shines light on voice brokers, FINANCIAL TIMES, February 16, 2012.
70 It is interesting to note that the lack of transparency of dealings in the City of London was one of
the concerns of the 1853 report [title], supra note [ ].
64
65
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sometimes resulting in unintended indiscretions (but which only reach the light of day in
the event of a major blow-up).
The global financial crisis was obviously a blow-up of major proportions. It exposed the
inward workings of the swaps and derivatives markets, among others. But lesser
scandals, such as the current one over the manipulation of LIBOR71, also illuminate
market practices which usually operate unknown to the general public. In particular, in
the LIBOR scandal, the pivotal role of “voice brokers” came to light.
Computers and Bloomberg terminals dominate trading floors, but the human
element remains a crucial feature of transacting across derivatives and other parts
of the global financial system. This is no better illustrated than by the presence of
so-called “voice brokers” who act as middle men for banks trading swaps and
other fixed income securities in financial centres that link Asia, Europe and the
US.72
Working in the interdealer market73, voice brokers convey prices to traders by telephone
and “squawk boxes”74 although they do use computer screens to display certain other
information. The voice brokers usually have several clients and a privileged view of
where the market may be heading. “[W]hen a very competitive price enters the market, a
voice broker will tell their best account the price before they tell their other accounts.”75
The persistence of oral transactions in finance would seem to defy the logic of modern
communications. But perhaps not. The oral contract in the lex mercatoria may have
been faute de mieux, nothing else was available that met the expediency and
expeditiousness of commerce (as well as the generalized illiteracy of prior ages). But
several other aspects of the oral transaction in commercial dealing likely also persist,
ensuring its longevity.
Supra,note [68] [Mackenzie FT article]. “Enforcement agencies in the US, Canada, Europe and Japan
are investigating whether employees at leading US and European banks colluded to influence where
Libor and other key benchmark rates were set, in some cases to profit on interest-rate derivatives
linked to the rates....’When you start trying to collude or price fix a benchmark that affects mortgage
rates, and the cost of certain car and school loans, it behoves regulators to take a very hard look’”.
72 Id,
73 “[T]he private arena where only banks trade with each other as they offset positions they have
with clients such as hedge funds, money managers and corporations’. Id.
74 An indication of how primitive the verbal communications systems were until relatively recently;
voices would be distorted and the speakers “squawk”.
75Supra, note [68][Mackenzie]
71
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The intimacy and immediacy of the human voice obviously contribute to the building of
the mutual trust that is characteristic of specialized industries and which is noted by
Berger, among others.76 This mutual trust develops in the face of rampant self-interest
and cutthroat competition. There are self-regulating limits; otherwise the market
implodes to everyone’s detriment.77
Related to the development of mutual trust, is speed and security. Voice negotiation
benefits from quick reaction times and opportunities for repositioning, advantages often
noted in the context of the “open outcry” exchange model before it finally succumbed to
technology.78
But perhaps the most intriguing aspect of oral transactions, in addition to their trustinducing nature, is their security. In modern finance, where trades are negotiated over the
telephone and squawk boxes, the human voice is key to identifying your counterparty.
Human beings demonstrate a remarkable capacity for voice recognition, especially
“active” voice recognition as opposed to “passive” voice recognition. The distinction is
based on actually participating in a conversation (a negotiation, for example) as opposed
to simply overhearing one.79 Interestingly enough, and there may be equally intriguing
reasons for this from the point of view of evolutionary biology, “[p]eople’s apparent
ability to recognize a voice they have heard before can be a [sic] high as 96% correct
(McGhee, 1937) when men recognize women’s voices.”80

Supra, note [ ][Berger]
This aspect of the derivatives markets was graphically illustrated in the recent movie Margin Call
[2011], one of the more authentic renditions of a market panic and collapse. The head trader resists
pressures from above to completely liquidate a portfolio of “toxic assets” on the basis that such an act
would destroy the market itself, as well as the firm on the sell side of the transactions. No one would
trade with the seller firm’s traders again. The depiction of the frenzied selling is also significant; the
transactions, in a volatile and rapidly moving market, are voice trades, where seller and buyer know
each other.
78 Again, see Margin Call for an example oral negotiation and repositioning by traders, as the market
slides and prices drop rapidly. Algorithmic trading is lightning fast, of course, but predetermined by
the algorithm and thus ultimately less flexible than voice trading.
79 See, generally, Richard Hammersley and J. Don Read, The Effect of Participation in a Conversation
on Recognition and Identification of the Speakers’ Voices, 9 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 71 (1985).
80 Id,.71. This makes a good case for putting more women on the trading floor; arguably it would
increase the rate of voice identification..

76
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The use of voice recognition as a trading device is explicitly acknowledged in both
financial industry practices and by their self-regulatory organizations. The interdealer
markets are small and clubby, as noted above, so a high degree of voice recognition
would be expected among traders and brokers in frequent contact. However, even in the
retail brokerage business, voice recognition is remarkably reliable, to the extent that it is
incorporated in in-house policies as well as binding industry association rules.81 For
example, “RBC Dominion Securities’ policy and procedures state that we must get verbal
confirmation of fax and email instructions before proceeding with a transaction. These
RBC DS policies are devised in order to be in compliance with our industry regulator’s
rules (i.e. the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada
(IIROC))(emphasis added) “82
Autonomy from the state, ie. self-regulation, and the legitimacy, perhaps even the
imperative, of oral contracting are both characteristics of pockets of modern finance.
And although the nature of self-regulation in finance and the purposes to which oral
contracts are put have mutated over the centuries, the outlines of the “ancient” lex
mercatoria persist.83 A resurgence of interest in legal pluralism, the recognition that
“law” may emanate from multiple sources and diverse processes, may be moving
recognition of operative concepts of lex mercatoria from the “periphery” as Berger calls
it, to a position of greater centrality.
This insight occurred to the peripatetic author when a long time broker contacted her by voice
mail at a summer house, asking for her to call and confirm instructions for reinvesting proceeds of
an investment which had just matured. Email and even fax were not sufficient for purposes of the
confirmation. The author, having reached the broker by telephone, joked that this must be a vestige
from an earlier, less technologically advanced era. However, the broker noted that although it had
been many years since he had heard the author’s voice [and would have dealt with hundreds of
clients in the interim], he had immediately recognized it. Equally, the author had immediately
recognized the broker’s voice despite the intervening period of many years.
82 Email to the author dated January 25, 2012 from Andras Birkus, RBC Dominion Securities, in the
possession of the author. See Guidelines for the review, supervision and retention of advertisements,
sales literature and correspondence, IIROC: “ Acceptance of orders communicated via email, voice
mail, or any other electronic means, other than a dedicated order-entry system, creates a number of
risks, such as delays in opening and executing instructions or inadequate instructions being provided
by the client. Clients and registered representatives should be strongly discouraged from
communicating order instructions via email or voice-mail. Having said that, if they choose to use
these methods of communication, clients should be warned of the risks described above.” Andras
Birkus noted in his email that the IIROC rules established the minimum standard, which individual
firm policies and guidelines often exceeded. IIROC is a self-regulatory organization.
83 Berger, supra note [ ].
81
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CONCLUSION
Several intriguing implications arise from viewing international financial markets as
being supported by a form, or more accurately, forms of lex mercatoria. Was the global
financial crisis triggered, in part, by a breakdown in the operation of lex mercatoria in
several crucial sectors of the financial industry?
In his fascinating study of diamond merchants84 in New York City,85 Barak Richman
investigates how it is that a diamond merchant will hand over hundreds of thousands of
dollars worth of diamonds against a promise to pay at a later date, essentially a sale on
credit. What precludes industry participants from taking advantage of these
“extraordinarily lucrative opportunities...to cheat”?86
The diamond industry, like other specialized areas of finance, spans centuries and
continents.87 The New York Diamond Dealer Club is modelled on centuries old
European diamond bourses, with their trading rules, membership requirements and
mandatory industry arbitration.88 Diamond merchants have “systematically rejected use
of public courts and state created law to enforce contracts and police behavior.”89
There are several factors which Richman identifies as crucial to the diamond merchant
industry in New York City. The industry is dominated by small number of merchants,
primarily ultra-orthodox Jews, a distinct ethnic community in New York, immediately
identifiable by their appearance, voice and manners. The community is bound together
by religious, family and commercial ties. The “traditional social structures that pervaded
Jewish communities throughout the world before the Enlightenment remain intact”.90
Strong, pervasive, reputational forces operate in multiple dimensions. Industry arbitration
publicizes broken promises. Significant, according to Richman, is the importance of the

Note the use of the word “merchant”.
Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond
Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 383 (2006).
86 Id., [383].
87 Id. [ ]. [Quote description in Richman article].
88 Id., [ ].
89 Id., [ ]. In fact, recourse to the courts will result in fines or suspension from the New York Diamond
Dealers Club and a possible end to a trading career.
90 Id., [ ].
84
85
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long view. Mutual trust is fostered by the desire of each merchant “to preserve the
opportunity to engage in future lucrative transactions,”91 a desire which extends beyond
the grave given the intergenerational nature of the business.
The old face of international finance, of which the diamond industry could be considered
a subset, shares some of the same characteristics. “Name and shame” is a venerable
regulatory technique of the London Stock Exchange, which itself as an institution, until
the very recent past, was modelled, and not coincidentally, along the same lines as the
New York Diamond Dealers Club. Investment firms were family firms, partnerships, the
business being passed from generation to generation. Homogeneity of ethnic and cultural
background was reinforced by the educational and class system in the UK and the closed,
clubby nature of the industry.92
But twenty-five years ago (at about the same time as derivatives began to appear), all that
started to change, for better or worse. The world of finance experienced a cultural and
institutional rupture with the past. Stock exchanges demutualized; no more were they
private clubs. Investment firms expanded rapidly, both in terms of personnel and
geographic reach, abandoning the partnership form. The walls protecting the
homogenous, culturally distinct, enclaves of finance were breached. The unspoken
assumptions and understandings were confused.. Most significantly, the long term and
intergenerational reputational pressures dissipated. Michael Lewis in his [1987] exposé of
bond trading on Wall Street described young traders, barely out of university, “blowing up”
their clients, by selling them products which would financially implode at a future date. By
that time, the young trader, pockets full, would have moved on, leaving the financial
carnage behind.93

Have the efforts to create international financial standards been an attempt to “fix” or
reinvent a lex mercatoria of finance? But by drawing on state, legislative and regulatory
Id., [ ].
The “old” Wall Street demonstrated similar characteristics. Interestingly enough, the institutional
structure and characteristics of the financial firms was mirrored in the elite Wall Street law firms
which serviced them. The lawyers were drawn from a small circle of elite law schools and constantly
interacted with each other. Prior to the internet, transactions were negotiated and structured by
means of endless conference calls. Oral undertakings and agreements with respect to deal structure
and documentation were scrupulously observed.
93 Liar’s Poker, [1987].
91
92
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models, are they looking in the wrong place. Do we need international financial
standards at all, or just better lex mercatoria? Will waves of re-regulation drive the
surviving lex mercatoria temporarily into hiding? Or will regulatory impasse, such as that
being experienced in the United States, promote the blossoming and transformation of
lex mercatoria new corners of the financial world?
There is much explanatory force in viewing international capital markets from the
perspective of a lex mercatoria. A better understanding of the normative forces at work,
lex mercatoria being among them, can point to better ways of providing oversight and
imparting integrity to the international markets.. As Gunther Teubner has noted, lex
mercatoria may be “soft law” , but it is not weak law.94

94

As cited in Berger, supra note [44]
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